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ABSTRACT
Having a precise vulnerability discovery model (VDM) would
provide a useful quantitative insight to assess software secu-
rity. Thus far, several models have been proposed with some
evidence supporting their goodness-of-fit.
In this work we describe an independent validation of the
applicability of six existing VDMs in seventeen releases of
the three popular browsers Firefox, Google Chrome and In-
ternet Explorer. We have collected five different kinds of
data sets based on different definitions of a vulnerability.
We introduce two quantitative metrics, goodness-of-fit en-
tropy and goodness-of-fit quality, to analyze the impact of
vulnerability data sets to the stability as well as quality of
VDMs in the software life cycles.
The experiment result shows that the“confirmed-by-vendors’
advisories” data sets apparently yields more stable and bet-
ter results for VDMs. And the performance of the s-shape
logistic model (AML) seems to be superior performance in
overall. Meanwhile, Anderson thermodynamic model (AT)
is indeed not suitable for modeling the vulnerability dis-
covery process. This means that the discovery process of
vulnerabilities and normal bugs are different because the in-
terests of people in finding security vulnerabilities are more
than finding normal programming bugs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Security, Vulnerability, Discovery Models Validation
1. INTRODUCTION
The vulnerability discovery process normally refers to the
post-release stage where people identify and report security
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flaws of a released software. Vulnerability discovery models
(VDM) operate on the known vulnerability data to estimate
the total number of vulnerabilities present in the software.
Successful models can be useful hints for both software ven-
dors and users in allocating resources to handle potential
breaches, and tentative patch update. For example, we do
not exactly know the day of major snow falls but cities ex-
pect it to fall in winter and therefore plan resources for road
clearing in that period. The effective planning is important
because security bugs are different than “normal” bugs. A
normal bugs might be filed and be scheduled for fixing in
the next release. Meanwhile a security vulnerability might
required an urgent patch to be shipped to customers lest
their browser be subject to rogue campaigns. Major shifts
in browser usage are often attributed to (real or perceived)
“more” security. Understanding the security trend is there-
fore important.
In this paper we consider six proposed VDMs. The first
model is Anderson’s Thermodynamic(AT) [5]. Rescorla pro-
posed two other models [17]: Quadratic (RQ) and Exponen-
tial (RE). The fourth model considered here is Alhazmi &
Malaiya’s Logistic (AML) model [1]. The fifth is directly
derived from a software reliability model, Logistic Poisson
(LP) (a.k.a Musa-Okumoto model). The last model is the
simple linear model (LN).
Among these models, the AML model has been subject
to a significant experimental validation: from operating sys-
tems [1, 2, 3, 4] (i.e., Windows NT/95/98/2K/XP, Red-
hat 6.2/7.1 and Fedora) to browsers [21] (i.e., IE, Firefox,
Mozilla), and web servers [20, 22] (i.e., ISS, Apache). The
results reported in the literature show that there is not
enough evidence to neither reject nor accept AML. Three
browsers were considered: one is strongly accepted by AML
(Mozilla), one is strongly rejected (IE), and another one is
unknown (Firefox).
These inconsistent results may be caused by a combina-
tion of factors. First, the authors did not clearly mention
what a vulnerability is. For example, the National Vulner-
ability Database (NVD) reports vulnerabilities which the
security bulletin of vendors do not classify as such.
The second problem is that the authors considered all ver-
sions of software as a single application, and counted vulner-
abilities for this“application”. Massacci et al. [14] has shown
that each Firefox version has its own code base, which may
differ by 30% or more from the immediately preceding one.
Therefore, as time goes by, we can no longer claim that we
are counting the vulnerabilities of the same application. To
explain visually this problem, Figure 1 shows in one plot the
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The figure shows the cumulative vulnerabilities reported for
six releases of Chrome (Chrome 1.0 to 6.0) by the number
of months since release. Different trends of different releases
suggest that different discovery model should be applied for
each release.
Figure 1: Google Chrome firework of vulnerability
discovery trends
cumulative vulnerabilities of the different versions of Chrome
in which we restart the counters for each version. It is imme-
diate to see that there is not a single “trend” but a “firework”
effect where each version determines its own trajectory.
1.1 Contribution of this Paper
This paper presents an independent validation experiment
on the goodness-of-fit of six existing VDMs against the three
most popular browsers: Firefox, Google Chrome and Inter-
net Explorer.
We also analyze the impact of vulnerability data sets based
on different definitions of vulnerability to the VDM’s perfor-
mance. Basically, the contribution of this paper is as follows.
• We introduce two qualitative metrics, namely goodness-
to-fit entropy and goodness-of-fit quality, to assess the
stability and quality of the goodness-of-fit of a VDM
in a certain data set.
• We show that some model (AT) does not work at all.
Reliability models do not seem to apply which is an
empirical confirmation that security is essentially dif-
ferent than reliability. Among six analyzed models,
AML seems to be superior in terms of goodness-of-fit
quality.
• The definition of vulnerability does indeed impact the
conclusion of a VDM study. If ones stick to a-vulnerability-
as-an-NVD (e.g., NVD, NVD.Advice in our study) as
the main source for counting, confirmed-by-vendors’
advisories NVD entries would yield more stable results
than raw NVD.
• We found that long life evolving software may have
more than one saturation periods when the number
of discovered vulnerabilities slowly increase, but then
continue increasing linearly. This probably is the effect
of code inheritance i.e., a large amount of lines of code
in the new code base is inherited from old ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the sub-
sequent section we present the related work (§2). Then we
describe our research questions and how to find out the
answers (§3). Next we briefly discuss existing VDMs and
their formulae (§4). Then we present how we collect vul-
nerability data sets used for the validation purpose (§5).
After that, we discuss the methodology to conduct the ex-
periment, and a discussion about the result in our experi-
ment (§6). Next, we discuss the impact of data sets to the
goodness-of-fit of VDMs (§7). We then study the evolution
of VDMs’ goodness-of-fit (§8), and the quality of VDMs (§9)
in the software life cycles. After a discussion about poten-
tial threats (§10) to the validity of our work we conclude the
paper (§11).
2. RELATEDWORK
Anderson [5] discussed the trade-off in security in open
source and close source systems. On one side ‘to many eyes,
all bugs are shallow’, but in the other side, ‘potential hackers
have also had the opportunity to study the software closely
to determine its vulnerabilities’. In this work, he proposed
a VDM (a.k.a. Anderson Thermodynamic, AT) based on
reliability growth models, in which the probability of a se-
curity failure at time t, when n bugs have been removed,
is in inverse ratio to t for alpha testers. This probability is
even lower for beta testers, λ times more than alpha testers.
However, he did not conduct any experiment to validate the
proposed model.
In other work about vulnerability discovery between white
hat (security researchers) and black hat (hackers), Rescorla
[17] discussed many shortcomings of NVD, but his study
heavily relies on it nonetheless. Rescorla proposed two math-
ematical models, called Linear model (a.k.a Rescorla Quadratic,
RQ) and Exponential model (a.k.a Rescorla Exponential,
RE). He has performed an experiment on four versions of
different operation systems (i.e., Windows NT 4.0, Solaris
2.5.1, FreeBSD 4.0 and RedHat 7.0). All of the cases, the
two models were able to fit the data with p-value ranged
from 0.167 to 0.589. In fact, we could not find any significant
difference between these models in term of goodness-of-fit
by doing a Wilcoxson test on their reported result (p-value
> 0.05).
Alhazmi and Malaiya [2] proposed another VDM inspired
by s-shape logistic model, called Alhazmi Malaiya Logistic
(AML). The idea beyond is to divide the discovery process
into three phases: learning phase, linear phase and satura-
tion phase. In the first phase, people need some time to
study the software, so less vulnerabilities are discovered. In
the second phase, when people get deeper knowledge of the
software, much more vulnerabilities are found. In the fi-
nal phase, since the software is going out of date, not much
people will use it. People lose interest in finding new vul-
nerabilities. So the cumulative vulnerabilities are stable. In
this work, the authors validated their proposal against sev-
eral versions of Windows (i.e., Win 95/98/NT4.0/2K) and
Linux (i.e., RedHat Linux 6.1, 7.1). Their model fitted Win
95 very well (p-value = 0.999991), and Win NT4.0 (p-value
= 0.923). For other versions, the p-value ranged from 0.054
to 0.317.
Alhazmi and Malaiya [3] compared their proposed model
with Rescorla’s 2005 (RE, RQ) and Anderson’s 2002 (AT) on
Windows 95/XP and Linux RedHat Linux 6.2, Fedora. The
result shows that their logistic model has a better goodness-
of-fit than others. For Windows 95 and Linux 6.2, as the vul-
nerabilities distribute along s-shape-like curves, only AML
is able to fit it (p-value=1), whereas all other models fail to
match the data (p-value ≤ 0.05). For Windows XP, the story
is different. RQ turns to be the best one with p-value= 0.97,
while AML poorly match the data (p-value=0.147).
Woo et al. [21] carried out an experiment on three browsers
IE, Firefox and Mozilla. However, it is unclear which ver-
sions of these browsers were analyzed. We speculate that
they did not distinguish between versions. This could have
a significant impact to their final result as we show later
in the paper. In their experiment, IE has not been fitted,
Firefox was fairly fitted, and Mozilla was good fitted. From
this result, we could not conclude any thing about the per-
formance of AML.
In another experiment, Woo et al. [20] validated AML
against two web servers: Apache and IIS. Also, they did not
distinguish between versions of Apache and IIS. In this ex-
periment, AML has demonstrated a very good performance
on vulnerability data of these web servers (p-value = 1).
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question is “does a model fit the observed
data?”. When a new VDM is proposed, the authors have
done some experiment to validate the applicability of this
VDM. Mostly, in their reports the proposed VDMs often
have good goodness-of-fit measures. As time goes by, the
goodness-of-fit may improve or deteriorate as more data be-
come available (either in terms of data point for the same
software or new software to be considered as an instance).
This motivate our first research question:
RQ1 Are existing VDMs able to fit cumulative numbers of
vulnerabilities of the popular browsers (i.e., IE, Fire-
fox, and Chrome)?
To find the answer, we discovered another, major and al-
most foundational issue: “what is a vulnerability?”. Most
related work did not explicitly discuss this question. Nor-
mally, a vulnerability is a security report describing a par-
ticular problem of a particular application, for instance: a
report in Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories (a.k.a an
MFSA entry), or an NVD report of NIST (NVD entry). In
the wisdom of many people, an NVD entry is a vulnerabil-
ity, but there are many other definitions [6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 18].
This raises the second research question in our study.
RQ2 How do different definitions of vulnerability impact the
VDMs’ goodness-of-fitness?
Figure 2 illustrates the vulnerability space of Firefox, in
which different ’kinds’ of Firefox vulnerabilities are coexisted
at different level of abstraction.
• Mozilla Bugzilla: contains very technical reports for
vulnerabilities, but also other normal programming bugs.
Bugzila entries, called bugs, are visualized as black cir-
cles in the figure.
• NVD : holds high level third-party security reports for
several applications, including Firefox. Many NVD
entries (gray ovals) mentioning Firefox maintain ref-
erences to Bugzilla (black circles inside ovals).
• MFSA: are set of vendor’s high level security reports
for Mozilla’s products. Each MFSA entry (rounded
rectangle) always references to one or more bugs (black
Bugzilla entry NVD entry MFSA Entry
This illustrates different abstract levels of vulnerability: devel-
oper level (Bugzilla) to user level (MFSA, Bugzilla). Bugzilla
entry denotes technical programming issues (both security and
non-security ones). Security bugzilla are ones reported in an
MFSA, or referenced by an NVD.
Figure 2: The vulnerability space of Firefox.
circles inside) responsible for this security flaw. MFSA
also holds links to corresponding NVD entries (over-
lapped ovals).
Depend on the judgement of analysts, different numbers of
vulnerabilities are observed and collected. Here, in Figure 2,
if we define a vulnerability is an MFSA, or NVD, or Bugzilla,
these numbers are respectively six, ten and fourteen. So
which is the actual number of vulnerabilities? This is also
the target of our third research question.
RQ3 Among vulnerability definitions, which is the most ap-
propriate in which VDMs yield most stable result?
In the fourth research question, we address the fact that
the fitness of a model might evolve over time. Then a model
might only be good at some times, but be deteriorate later.
Therefore, this research question focuses on the fitness of a
VDM in the lifetime of software products.
RQ4 Among existing VDMs, which one is globally supe-
rior?
To work out these issues, we collected vulnerability-as-
an-NVD data set for the three popular browsers. Then we
fitted existing VDMs using observed data, and see how well
they are (RQ1). Next, we collected other data sets with
respect to other definitions, and fitted VDMs by these data
sets (RQ2). We estimated the entropy of goodness-of-fit for
each data set to know in which data set, VDMs may yield
more stable result. This estimation is used to justify data
sets (RQ3). And finally, we ranked VDMs based on their
goodness-of-fit during the life time of software (RQ4).
4. VULNERABILITYDISCOVERYMODELS
This section provides a quick glance about six VDMs. As
denoted in [3], these VDMs are main features of the vulner-
ability discovery models. Here, only the formulae of these
six models are discussed. The detail rationale of models as
well as the meaning of each parameter can be found in the
original work or in [3]. All these parameters are estimated
using non-linear regression on observed data.
• Alhazmi-Malaiya Logistic (AML): proposed by Alhazmi
& Malaiya [2], inspired by the s-shape curve. The ra-
tionale behind is the assumption that vulnerability dis-
covery process is accounted into three phases. Learn-
ing phase: software has just been released, people need
Table 1: Formal definitions of six VDMs in the
study.
This table lists existing VDMs considered in the alphabetical order.
The rationale of formulae and the meaning of each parameter should
be found in original work of each model. All parameters are estimated
based on non-linear regression on observed data.
Model Formula
Alhazmi-Malaiya Logistic (AML) Ω(t) =
B
BCe−ABt + 1
Anderson Thermodynamic (AT) Ω(t) =
K
γ
ln(t) + C
Linear (LN) Ω(t) = At+ B
Logistic Poisson (LP) Ω(t) = β0 ln(1 + β1t)
Rescorla Exponential (RE) Ω(t) = N(1− e−λt)
Rescorla Quadratic (RQ) Ω(t) =
At2
2
+ Bt
time to learn new software. Vulnerabilities are slowly
detected. Linear phase: people get acquainted to the
software, more vulnerabilities are rapidly discovered.
Saturation phase: software becomes stable (or people
move to new software), less vulnerabilities are discov-
ered.
• Anderson Thermodynamic (AT): the application of this
model to vulnerabilities is proposed by Anderson [5].
The author assumed that finding a vulnerability (or
bug) after another one is much more harder as time
goes by when the reliability of software increases. The
term thermodynamic originates by the analogy from
thermodynamics, in which γ accounts for the lower
failure rate during beta testing compared to higher
rates during alpha testing.
• Linear model (LN): this is the simplest model, and well
known by most people. Linear model is often used to
express the trend line of data.
• Logistic Poisson (LP): is originated from the field of
reliability engineering, also known as Musa-Okumoto
model [15]. The idea of the model was that “the fail-
ure intensity would decrease exponentially with the
expected number of failures experienced”[15]. In the
formula, β0 represents the total number of faults that
would eventually be detected, β1 is the per-fault hazard
rate for the exponential model [12].
• Rescolar Exponential (RE): this model is a work of
Rescorla [17], inspired by the Goel-Okumoto model[10]
in software reliability engineering, in which the reliabil-
ity is increasing. The number of vulnerabilities discov-
ered in a single product is assumed to follow a Poisson
process. Then, in the formulal, N is the eventually
total number of vulnerabilities, and λ is the rate of
discovery.
• Rescolar Quadratic (RQ): is also proposed in [17] while
attempting to identify trends in the vulnerability dis-
covery using statistical tests. The rationale behind is
that the vulnerability finding rate varies linearly with
time. The cumulative number of vulnerabilities is thus
represented as a quadratic curve.
Table 2: Data sets collected for major releases of IE,
Firefox and Chrome.
Bullets (•) indicate enabled data sets. Dashes (—), otherwise, mean
there is no data sources available to collect the data sets.
nvdnvd.Bugnvd.Advicenvd.Nbugadvice.NbugReleases/Datasets
Chrome • • — • — 6/18(v1.0–v6.0)
Firefox • • • • • 6/30 (v1.0–v3.6)
IE • — • — — 5/10 (v4.0–v8.0)
Total 17 12 11 12 6 17/58
5. DATA COLLECTION
Vulnerability information for the three browsers IE, Fire-
fox, and Chrome is available in multiple sources, from multi-
vender source like National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
to vendors’ advisories and bug trackers e.g., Mozilla Founda-
tion Security Avisories (MFSA), Mozilla Bugzilla, or Chrome
Issues Tracker. To evaluate the impact of vulnerability def-
initions to the goodness-of-fit of VDM, we collect different
data sets with respective to different definitions.
• NVD(X): a vulnerability is an nvd entry that mentions
version X (i.e., version X appears in the vulnerable con-
figuration section of this nvd entry).
• NVD.Bug(X): a vulnerability is an nvd entry that men-
tions version X. And this nvd entry has one or more
links in the references section to a bug report of the
software vendor.
• NVD.Advice(X): a vulnerability is an nvd entry that
mentions version X. And this nvd entry has one or
more links in the references section to a security advi-
sory report of the software vendor (the advisory report
might not mention version X, but only some later ver-
sion).
• NVD.Nbug(X): a vulnerability is a bug report of the
vendor. This bug report also appears in the references
section of an nvd entry that mentions version X.
• ADVICE.NBug(X): a vulnerability is a bug report of the
software vendor. This bug report is also mentioned in
an advisory report of the software vendor. This advi-
sory report also has one or more links to an nvd entry
that mentions version X. One exception is that many
advisory reports of Firefox v1.0 have no link to NVD
and we considered all bugs mentioned in these advi-
sory reports as vulnerabilities for v1.0 even without
nvd links.
In the NVD.NBug(X) and ADVICE.NBug(X), we do not
know the releases that a bug might impact, we assume that
a bug impact all configurations mentioned in the nvd refer-
enced by this bug. However, not all bugs explicitly reference
to nvd. In this case, we apply the bug-to-nvd linking scheme
which includes following rules:
• if a bug is listed in the references of a nvd, this bug is
linked to this nvd.
• if a bug and a nvd are clustered in an advisory report
(e.g., mfsa), this bug is considered to be linked to this
nvd.
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This figure illustrates feature goodness in Table 3. The circles indicate cumulative vulnerabilities at a certain time. The horizontal axis (X)
is time-in-market measured by the number of months since officially released. The vertical axis (Y) is the cumulative vulnerabilities. Top 3
indicates the order of VDMs sorted by p-values. The label next to the VDM’s name in the legend shows the goodness-of-fit of this VDM.
Figure 3: VMDs’ goodness-of-fit on browsers in NVD data set.
We finally collected 58 data sets, and we used these data
set to run the VDM experiment on 17 major releases of the
three browsers. The detail of which data sets are available
on which releases is reported in Table 2.
6. VALIDATION OF VDM
6.1 Validation Methodology
The steps of validating VDMs are quite straight forward.
We first observe the data. Here, they are cumulative num-
bers of vulnerabilities monthly from the release date. Thus
far all these models are mostly validated using vulnerability-
is-an-NVD assumption, which corresponds to our NVD data
set. Hence their data sets are collection of NVD entries pub-
lished. To make our experiment comparable, we also use
this definition of vulnerability, and run the goodness-of-fit
experiment on the NVD data set. Besides, NVD is the only
common data set among the three browsers (see Table 2).
Second, we fit VDMs into the all data points of the ob-
served data using R[16] tool. Finally, expected values of each
model are computed for the goodness-of-fit test. We employ
chi-square (χ2) goodness-of-fit for this purpose. This test is
based on χ2 statistics calculated as follows.
χ2 =
n∑
i=1
(Oi − Ei)2
Ei
(1)
Oi and Ei orderly denote the oberseved values come from
observation, and expected values generated by VDMs. The
smaller χ2, the higher goodness a VDM gains. In practice,
a VDM is acceptably fitted if the χ2 is less than a critical
value, given a significant level (α) and degrees of freedom.
The p-value here represents the significance of the differences
between observed values and expected values. If the p-value
is small, differences are significant, not by chance. Thus, the
smaller p-value, the stronger evidence a VDM does not fit
the data. Hence, we interpret the goodness-of-fit based on
the ranges of p-value as follows
• Not Fit : p-value ∈ [0 ∼ 0.05), the difference is signif-
icant, not by chance. This evidence is strong enough
to reject the model.
• Good Fit : p-value ∈ [0.95 ∼ 1.0], the difference, in
opposite to the previous, is significant small. It is a
strong evidence to accept the model.
• Inconclusive Fit : p-value ∈ [0.05 ∼ 0.95), there is not
enough evidence to neither reject nor accept the model.
6.2 Result and Discussion
We run the goodness-of-fit experiment for six VDMs on
seventeen releases using NVD data set. The experiment gen-
erates 102 curves (and lines), so it is impossible to show them
all. Figure 3, as for the illustrative purpose, only describes
charts that highlight features in our result.
Among analyzed releases, many releases are old, which
are shipped to users many years ago, and many releases
have just been recently released. This diversification would
provide us a good picture the behavior of VDMs in differ-
ent period of application. Vulnerabilities of old releases are
intuitively more stable than that of younger ones. Hence,
a good VDM should be able to capture the vulnerability
distribution of old releases.
To this extent, Figure 3 shows the fitted plots of VDMs
in selected releases, i.e., IE6, IE7, IE8, Firefox v1.0–v3.6,
Chrome 4, using NVD data set. We choose NVD data set
to make our result comparable with others. We select these
releases since they are more representative for two afore-
mentioned groups of applications: old releases (i.e., IE6,
Firefox v1.0, and IE7), and young releases (i.e., IE8, Firefox
v3.6, and Chrome 4). In this figure, the cumulative numbers
of vulnerabilities are illustrated as empty cycle, and fitted
VDMs are visualized by lines with different patterns. We
have six analyzed VDMs, but in this figure, we only show
top three VDMs which have better results then others in
terms of p-value.
The vulnerability distribution of IE6, and IE7 are still in-
creasing in a nearly linear manner. This might be these fol-
lowing reasons. First, people are still interested in these two
browsers since they are shipped with Windows XP which
has a noticeable amount of users. Thus people keep search-
ing vulnerabilities in these browsers. Second, there a lot
amount of code base of IE6, 7 are inherited in later releases
(i.e., IE8, IE9), then many vulnerabilities discovered later
in IE8, IE9 are originated from retrospective releases (i.e.,
IE6, IE7).
This data distribution could explain the goodness-of-fit of
VDMs which support linear modeling. Thus, in IE7, the LP
model fitted the data very well, RQ and LN models might
fit the data. Other models (not shown here) did not fit
data well because their hypothesis shapes are not appropri-
ate. Meanwhile, even though the increasing of IE6’s vul-
nerability seems to be linear, but the variance of numbers
of vulnerabilities around the perfect linear model falsifies
most VDMs, except AML since the observed data forms a
stretched S-shape.
The chart of Firefox v1.0 shows a different phenomenon,
called after-life vulnerabilities in which many vulnerabilities
are discovered after a release is out of official support [14].
Vulnerabilities of Firefox v1.0 were discovered linearly in the
first 20 months of life time, but then mostly constant in the
next 20 months. However, this number is increasing later
on until now. We speculate that when Firefox v1.0 was re-
leased, it attracted many attacks but later on people were
losing interested in finding new vulnerabilities of this re-
lease. Then the number of vulnerabilities increased because
a large portion of code in Firefox v1.0 is still alive in modern
releases of Firefox [14]. And many vulnerabilities reported
later are also applied to this very first release. This kind
of distribution challenges all analyzed VDMs since none of
analyzed VDMs taken this phenomenon into account, and
hence they are all false for Firefox v1.0.
In the bottom parts of Figure 3, all the releases (IE8,
Firefox v3.6, and Chrome 4) are still young. Thus the dis-
tribution of vulnerabilities for these releases are linear. So,
many VDMs that address linear model could fit the data.
To have a overview picture about the performance of VDMs
in NVD data set, Table 3 reports the goodness-of-fit for 102
curves of all releases. Here, instead of reporting a big table
of numbers, Table 3 shows the interpretation of p-value of
the χ2 tests. This presentation also helps to study at higher
abstract level than the raw p-values. In this table, there are
47 times VDMs can either well fit or inconclusively fit the
data, and 55 times they do not work. Roughly speaking,
the chance of fit is about 50%. If we look at each VDM
particularly, the AML model appears to be the best one as
it obtains more positive results than others. In contract, the
AT model seems to be the worst because it could only fit one
release (IE v7.0). Meanwhile, other models are equivalent
in number of times being rejected and accepted, except the
LP model which is likely a bit better.
As a conclusion of this section, fitting VDMs into NVD
data set give a hint that the assumption behind of the AML
model is slightly appropriate to observed data. This idea
apparently captures the way people discover vulnerability
in practice. And in the first months of software’s lifetime,
the vulnerabilities of software increases linearly. Hence, any
models support linear modeling could be able to fit the ob-
served data. However, depend on the shapes of the mod-
els, sometime a model is better than another ones. But we
hardly say which one is better than the others, except, a
Table 3: The goodness-of-fit of VDMs using data set
NVD.
The goodness of fit of a VDM is based on p-value in the χ2 test.
p-value < 0.05: not fit (–), p-value ≥ 0.95: good fit (X), and incon-
clusive fit (?) otherwise.
Firefox Chrome IE
Model 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.6 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
AML – – ? ? ? ? X ? ? ? ? ? X ? ? – X
AT – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – ? –
LN – – X – X ? – – – ? – – – – – ? ?
LP – – X ? X X – – – – ? ? – X – X ?
RE – – X ? X X – – – – ? ? – X – ? ?
RQ – – – ? ? X – – ? ? ? ? – – – – X
more confidence conclusion about the performance of AT
model, which very poor is almost cases. The assumption
of AT model is completely not applicable for vulnerability
detection.
However, since the goodness-of-fit of VDMs might change
overtime, To have a better insight, in subsequent section,
we will study the evolution of VDMs’ goodness-of-fit with
respect to the software life time.
7. THE IMPACT OF DATA SETS
Figure 4 displays the notched box plots of browser re-
leases and data sets to the observed cumulative vulnera-
bilities. The non-overlap notches between boxes indicate a
statistically difference between their median. The distribu-
tions of vulnerabilities in data sets indeed reflect the way
they are collected. If we take NVD data set as a base line,
the NVD.Bug and NVD.Advice are subsets of NVD that only
select nvd entries which have one or more confirmed links
to a bug report or security advisory, respectively, by ven-
dors. Thus, the numbers of vulnerabilities in NVD.Bug and
NVD.Advice are less than NVD.
Meanwhile, NVD.Advice and NVD.Bug look quite similar.
It is because many nvd entries which have links to vendors’
security advisories, also have links to vendors’ bug reports.
So, these two data sets look the same. This is also confirmed
by the statistical test. The Fligner-Killeen test on homo-
geneity of variances shows that NVD.Bug and NVD.Advice
are pretty homogenous (p-value = 0.996).
The NVD.Nbug and Advice.Nbug, respectively, count num-
bers of bugs in nvd entries and vendors’ security advisories.
So, NVD.Nbug and Advice.Nbug are basically multipliers of
NVD.Bug and NVD.Advice. Since a vendors’ security advi-
sory entry, in the case of Firefox, often has more links to bug
reports than a nvd entry does, the number of vulnerabilities
of Advice.Nbug is larger than that of NVD.Nbug.
In general, the non-overlap notches (except NVD.Bug and
NVD.Advice) show a statistically difference between the me-
dian among these five data sets. It gives a hint that different
conclusions might be drawn from these data sets.
To better understand how data sets impact to the per-
formance of VDMs, we compare the distribution of p-value
generated by fitting each data set to all VDMs. To make
the comparison more precise, we try to use at much data
points as possible. However, since some data sets are not
available for some browsers (see Table 2), we can only com-
pare data sets in browsers that are supported by the data
sets. In particular, we compare all five data sets in Firefox’s
vulnerabilities because all these five data sets provide data
for Firefox. For Chrome and Firefox, we can only compare
lnvd nvd.bug nvd.advice nvd.Nbug advice.Nbug
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Figure 4: The box plots of the cumulative vulnera-
bilities of the data sets.
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Box plots showing the distribution of p-values of all VDMs across data
sets. Left (a) shows the impact of data sets to the VDMs’ performance
in Firefox. Middle (b) reports the impact of shared data sets between
Firefox and Chrome, and Right (c) is the impact of shared data sets
between IE and Firefox.
Figure 5: The impact of data sets to the quality of
VDMs.
NVD, NVD.Bug, NVD.Nbug. And for Firefox and IE, we
can compare NVD and NVD.Advice. For IE, Firefox, and
Chrome, NVD is the only data set support all these three
browser, so we cannot make comparison.
The effect of different data sets to VDM is more clearly
presented in Figure 5. This figure reports the p-values dis-
tribution of χ2-test of all VDMs across data sets. The left-
most box plot in this figure shows the difference among data
sets while fitting Firefox’s vulnerabilities. Apparently, the
p-value’s spectrum of NVD.Advice seems better than others:
50% of the cases p-value is greater than 0.4, whereas, 50% of
others is less than 0.2. It means that the chances of getting a
good fit by choosing NVD.Advice is greater than other mod-
els. This phenomenon is also appeared in the rightmost box
plots for Firefox and IE. In the meanwhile, it seems there is
not big difference among the medians of NVD, NVD.Bug and
NVD.Nbug as demonstrated in the box plots of both Fire-
fox and Firefox & Chrome. Though, NVD looks better than
NVD.Bug and NVD.Nbug since its high quartile is greater
than others’.
In summary, the analysis shows an evidence that count-
ing vulnerabilities in different ways, which result in different
vulnerability data sets, would impact to the overall quality
of VDMs. And fitting the data of NVD.Advice, VDMs have
more chances to obtain Good Fit. This means that exist-
ing VDMs can better model the trend of vulnerabilities that
are both confirmed by NVD and vendors’ security advisories
(NVD.Advice) than other data models.
8. THEEVOLUTIONOFVDM’SGOODNESS-
OF-FIT IN DATA SETS
The observation done in the previous section (§7) pro-
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There are three states in the model: Fit (F), Inconclusive(I) , and
NotFit (NF). As more data available, a Fit model may remain Fit,
or become Inconclusive, or NotFit. This evolution is represented by
transitions. The labeled numbers on transitions denote transition’s
names.
Figure 6: The goodness-of-fit transition model.
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The box plots illustrate the distribution of VDMs’ goodness-of-fit en-
tropy E1 in different data sets. The calculation of entropy follows (2)
with β = 1.
Figure 7: Box plots of entropies (β = 1).
vides an evidence that existing VDM can model the trend of
vulnerabilities reported in NVD.Advice data set better than
other data sets at the time when data sets are collected. For
a better insight, this section aims to analyze whether this
phenomenon is consistent for a long period or just happen by
chance. The analysis result will also address the RQ3 about
choosing the most appropriate data set that is more suitable
for VDMs. The selection criteria are not only the data set
that can be well modeled by VDMs (i.e., VDMs would ob-
tain more Good Fit), but more important, the data set in
which the performances of VDMs are more stable than in
other data sets.
To this purpose we run the goodness-of-fit experiment
during the life time of analyzed releases. For each release,
we observe the evolution of VDMs’ goodness-of-fit with re-
spect to the evolution of data set during the release’s life
time. The life time of a software is the number of months
since release time (MSR). The first MSR of a software is the
end of the month after the released date. The second MSR
is the end of month after the first MSR, and so on. For ex-
ample, IE v4.0 is released in September, 19971. hence, the
first MSR is on 31 October, 1997, and the first observation is
on the sixth MSR, 31 March 1998. The observation begins
at the sixth month when a release is officially shipped to
users, and repeats monthly until the last day when data is
collected. The cumulative numbers of vulnerabilities at ob-
servation points are fitted into all VDMs. The experiment
generated 14, 817 curves in total.
Let us consider one VDM. When fitting data to this VDM,
1Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_
Explorer
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This figure shows the detail evolution of goodness-of-fit entropies of all data sets. The observation period for each type of data set depended on
the the products’ lifetime supported by the data sets. The solid lines indicate the grand median of entropies in the whole period. The dash lines
and dotted lines show the median of entropies for the first-half and second-half period. The performance of VDMs are more stable if the median
of the second-half is less than or equal the median of the first-half.
Figure 8: The evolution of goodness-of-fit entropies of all data sets.
we can get either Good Fit, or Inconclusive, or Not Fit. Sup-
pose that at the observation time t and t+ 1, the goodness-
of-fits are GoFt, and GoFt+1, respectively. If GoFt equals
GoFt+1, we say that the VDM is stable during period (t..t+
1), otherwise the VDM is unstable. We introduce a measure-
ment for the stable of VDMs, called goodness-of-fit entropy,
by counting the number of times that the goodness-of-fit of
a VDM changes.
To formally define the goodness-of-fit entropy, we use the
goodness-of-fit transition model as depicted in Figure 6. The
model consists of three states: Fit (F), Inconclusive (I), and
Not Fit (NF). The VDMs’ goodness-of-fits are initially clas-
sified into one of these states in the 6th MSR. The goodness-
of-fit states can be subsequently evolved to other states ac-
cording to the transitions. The model has total nine transi-
tions labeled from 1 to 9, denoted as #i, falling into one of
three categories, unchanged, small jump, and big jump. The
unchanged transitions (#1, #2, and #3) mean the states are
unchanged, in order words, there is no entropy. The small
jump transitions (#4–#7) denote a smaller change (com-
pared to big jump) of p-value from Good Fit (≥ 0.95) to
Inconclusive ([0.05..0.95)), or from Inconclusive to Not Fit
(< 0.05), and vice versa. In the meanwhile, big jump transi-
tions (#8,#9) show a big change from Good Fit to Not Fit
and versa.
The goodness-of-fit entropy at observation time t is esti-
mated by counting the number of transitions when moving
from time t − 1 to time t. Since the the levels of instabil-
ity of transitions are not equal, the contribution of different
kinds of transition into the overall entropy might be differ-
ent. Since unchanged transitions do not contribute to the
entropy, we define β as the factor that big jump is β times
as chaos as small jump. The calculation of goodness-of-fit
entropy follows this equation:
Eβ(t) =
|smalljump|t + β · |bigjump|t
|unchanged|t + |smalljump|t + β · |bigjump|t
(2)
where |XXjump|t is the numbers of XXjump transitions
when moving from time t− 1 to time t.
The goodness-of-fit entropy measured in (2) ranges from
0 to 1. Entropy equals 0 when |smalljumps+bigjump| = 0.
It denotes a local stability of goodness-of-fit when moving
from time t − 1 to time t. On the contrary, entropy equals
1 when |unchanged| = 0, which is a complete chaos.
conclusion: These small medians show an evidence that
VDMs’s goodness-of-fits are somehow stable within these
data sets. In detail, the overlapped notches among NVD,
NVD.Advice, NVD.Nbug and ADVICE.Nbug give a hint that
the stability of VDMs in these data sets is not much dif-
ferent. Meanwhile, the median of NVD.bug is significant
greater than others’.
The box plots in Figure 7 report the distribution of the
evolution of goodness-of-fit entropies. Generally, about 75%
of the cases of most data sets, the entropy is less than 0.1.
Moreover, the overlapped notches among NVD, NVD.Advice,
NVD.Nbug and ADVICE.Nbug give a hint that the medians
of entropy of these four data set are not statistically dif-
ferent. Meanwhile, the median of NVD.bug is significant
greater than others’. This observation is confirmed by the
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test on the variance of entropies.
The null hypothesis is “there is no difference between the
median of entropies among data sets”. The Kruskal-Wallis
test four data sets NVD, NVD.Advice, NVD.Nbug and AD-
VICE.Nbug yields p-value = 0.271, which means we do not
have enough evidence to conclude about the difference their
medians. And the Kruskal-Wallis test for all five data sets
yields p-value = 0.0040, which confirms the significant dif-
ferent of NVD.Advice and other data sets.
To understand how entropies evolve, we divide the obser-
vation period of each data sets into two parts, namely first-
half and second half, then we calculate the median for two
parts. A stable evolution would result that the entropy me-
dian of the first-half is greater (or equal) the entropy median
of the second-half. It is because the decreasing of entropy
median means the VDMs become more stable as more data
are available in the data set.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of goodness-of-fit entropy for
each data set. The solid lines indicate the grand medians for
the whole observation periods. The dash lines denotes the
medians of the first half periods and dotted lines illustrate
the medians of the second half periods. Notice that the
grand medians of the plot are exactly the medians of data
sets illustrated in Figure 7. This is obvious since the Figure 7
is the summary view of Figure 8.
Look at the trends of evolution, the entropy variation of
NVD.Advice seems to be lesser than other data sets. More-
over the second half median of NVD.Advice is less than the
first haft median. So, NVD.Advice seems to be a good can-
didate data set. The NVD.Nbug also has the median of the
second half less than the median of the second half, but
the entropy variation of NVD.Nbug in the second half looks
bigger than that of NVD.Advice. In the opposite direction,
NVD.Bug is very bad. The plot of entropy is very dynamic,
especially in the second half. The entropy median increases
in the second half period, which might imply a more insta-
bility performance of VDMs.
To ensure that NVD.Bug is a worst one, we additional
employ one-side Mann-Whiney U test to perform pairwise
tests between the entropies of NVD.Bug and others’ with the
alternative hypothesis “the entropy distribution of NVD.Bug
is stochastic larger than others”. Notice that, since multiple
comparisons are employed, Bonferroni correction is applied
with the number of tests n = 4, so the significance level
α′ = 0.05/4 = 0.0125. The result of these tests shows that
the entropy variation of NVD.Bug is larger than NVD (p-
value = 1.82 · 10−4), NVD.Advice (p-value = 1.3 · 10−3), and
ADVICE.Nbug (p-value = 0.004). For the comparison test
between NVD.Bug and NVD.Nbug, the p-value = 0.06 > α′.
Even though it is not enough evidence to conclude, but it is
very near to the point that the entropy variation of NVD.bug
is larger than that of NVD.Nbug.
In summary, all five analyzed data sets achieve a good
stability for VDMs’ goodness-of-fit performance in overall.
The entropy of VDMs’ performance is less than 0.2% (0 -
for perfect stability, and 1 - for completely dynamic) for all
data sets. Among the data sets, NVD.bug is the worst it is
significantly more unstable than other data sets, and more
importantly, NVD.bug tends to be more unstable when more
data are available (i.e., entropy of the second-half period
is greater than that of the first-half period). In the other
side, NVD.Advice is slightly better than others. Even though
there is no significant difference among medians, NVD.Advice
is apparently the appropriate data sets for VDMs because
VDMs’ goodness-of-fits in these data sets are more stable
when more data is available.
9. THE TEMPORAL QUALITY OF VDM
This section addresses the research question RQ4. To
know which VDM is globally better than other, we ana-
lyze the performance of VDMs in the life time of analyzed
releases. We introduce another measurement for the per-
formance of a VDM, namely goodness-of-fit quality Q (or
quality for short).
The quality of a VDM depends on how well it can fit
the vulnerability data of analyzed releases. Thus this qual-
ity measurement can vary over time since the vulnerability
data evolve over time as we can see in the previous section
(§8). The VDM’s quality at time t is measured by the ratio
between the number of Good Fits (p-value of χ2 goodness-
of-fit ≥ 0.95) by the total number of fits at time t. Besides,
since we could not conclude about an Inconclusive Fit when
its p-value ranged from 0.05 to 0.95, an Inconclusive Fit also
contributes to the overall quality, but may be not as good as
a Good Fit. Thus, we use an extra factor ω to denote that
a Good Fit is ω times as good as an Inconclusive Fit. The
formula is defined as follows.
Qω(t) =
|Fit|t + 1/ω · |Inconclusive|t
|Fit|t + |Inconclusive|t + |NotF it|t (3)
where |X|t is the number of times a VDM obtains goodness-
of-fit X at time t (X is Fit, Inconclusive or Not Fit). Qω(t)
is distributed from 0 to 1. Qω(t) = 0 indicates a VDM does
not fit any data; and, Qω(t) = 1 shows that a VDM can fit
all data very well.
Figure 9 shows the notched box plots of global goodness-
of-fit quality of VDMs. Top are plots of VDMs’ quality
no mater what the data sets. Bottom are the similar plots
but restricted to NVD.Advice data set only. To additionally
evaluate how the difference between a Good Fit and an In-
conclusive (ω factor) impacts the the final quality, left plots
show the VDMs’ quality where a Good Fit is as good as
an Inconclusive (ω = 1); and right plots shows the VDMs’
quality where a Good Fit is twice as good as an Inconclusive
(ω = 2).
If we ignore the data sets (top plots), Roughly 75% of the
case AML model has a better quality than other models.
Meanwhile, the quality of AT model is the worst. This is
true regardless the value of ω. For other models, the plots
shows that there is not much different among LN, LP and
RE models. The RQ is slightly worse than others since the
first quartile of the distribution is much lower than others’.
Previous section has showed that NVD.Advice is slightly
better than other data sets. So, in the bottom plots, we an-
alyze the quality of VDMs in NVD.Advice. Here, we observe
the same phenomenon for both AML and AT models. For
other models, LP and RE look like the same; but LN and
RQ models are slightly better.
This result is quite compliant with the previous analysis in
NVD data set at the time data collected (see §6). This would
allow us to make stronger conclusions about the performance
of analyzed VDM.
First, AT model is absolutely not a right model for vul-
nerability discovery process. It means that the rationale
behind the AT model is not applicable for vulnerability de-
tection. Besides, the two model LP and RE also do not
obtain a good quality comparing to other models, especially
the AML model. If we consider an Inconclusive Fit is half as
good as a Good Fit, and we use the NVD.Advice, the qualities
of these two models, LP and RE, are even lower than other
models. Thus, AT, LP, RE model are indeed not good op-
tions for vulnerability detection. These three models share a
common point that is they are all based on reliability mod-
els using to express the discovery process of normal bugs.
The core difference between reliability models and VDM is
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Top charts show the quality of VDMs in all data sets. Meanwhile,
bottom charts illustrate the quality of VDMs in NVD.Advice data sets.
In left charts, a Good Fit is as good as an Inconclusive Fit (ω = 1).
And in the right charts, a Good Fit is twice as good as an Inconclusive
Fit (ω = 2).
Figure 9: The VDMs’ goodness-of-fit quality.
the motivation of detectors. In the former, detectors are
software engineers (testers, quality control), so they only in-
vest on finding bugs so that the reliability of an application
reaches to a certain threshold. In the later, whereas, de-
tectors are the whole community who are interested in the
application. The motivation of finding a vulnerability there-
fore much bigger than finding a normal bug, and also last for
longer time (depend on the number of users of an applica-
tion). Existing reliability-based VDMs which do not capture
this phenomenon could not obtain good performance.
Notably, the three model AT, RE, LP are both based on
reliability models, but the RE and LP could obtain better
performance that the AT model. This is true because of
the shapes of each model. The shape of AT model does
not express very well the first period of vulnerability dis-
covery when vulnerabilities are found in an (approximately)
linear manner. The RE and LP, whereas, can do this bet-
ter. Hence, AT model fails most of the cases, and RE and
LP models still obtain good results when the evolution of
vulnerability is linear.
Second, AML model is better than other model since its
assumptions match better the actual behavior of community
in finding vulnerability of a software.
10. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Bias in data collection. This work employs the same tech-
nique discussed in [13] to parse HTML pages of MFSA,
and process the XML data of NVD and Bugzilla. Even
though the collector tool has been checked for multiple
times, it might contain bugs affecting to data collec-
tion.
Bias in bug-to-nvd linking scheme. While collecting data
for ADVICE.Nbug, we apply some rules to link a bug to
an nvd based on their locations in the MFSA report.
Nevertheless, this might be incorrect. We manually
checked some links for the relevant connection between
bug reports and NVD entries. They were found to be
consistent. However, again, it might not be always
true.
Overestimation of number of bugs in each version. We
do not know exactly which versions that a bug affects.
Consequently, we assume that a bug affects all versions
mentioned in the linked nvd. This might overestimate
the number of vulnerabilities in each version. To mit-
igate the problem, we calculate the latest release that
a bug might impact, and filter all vulnerable releases
after this latest. This calculation is done using the bug
fixes mining technique discussed in [19].
Error in curve fitting. We estimate the goodness-of-fit of
VDMs by using the Nonlinear Least-Square technique
implemented in R (nls() function). This might not
produce the most optimal solution. That essentially
impacts the validity of this work. To mitigate this
issue, we additionally employ a commercial tool i.e.,
CurveExpert Pro2 to cross check the goodness-of-fit.
Bias in statistic tests. Our conclusions are based on statis-
tics tests. These tests have their own assumptions.
Choosing tests whose assumptions are violated might
end up with wrong conclusions. To reduce the risk
we carefully analyzed the assumptions of the tests, for
instance, we did not apply any tests with normality
assumption since the distribution of vulnerabilities is
not normal.
11. CONCLUSION
In this work we addressed a fundamental question in vul-
nerability discovery modeling “do existing VDMs work?”.
We have conducted an experiment in which we fitted six
existing VDMs (i.e., AML, AT, LN, LP, RE and RQ) to
fifty eight data sets of seventeen releases of three popular
web browsers IE, Firefox and Chrome.
This experiment confirmed that the assumption behind of
the AML model, which vulnerability discovery process follow
three phases: learning, linear, and saturation, is more appro-
priate to observed data. This idea apparently captures the
way people discover vulnerability in practice. However, in
the case of Firefox, since a large portion of the old code based
is inherited in modern releases [14], therefore many vulner-
abilities of the very first releases (e.g., v1.0, v1.5) continue
to increase after a period of saturation even though these
releases are retired (out of support). It explains for the not
fit results of all of VDMs in these releases since none of them
is able to capture this phenomenon.
In the opposite side, AT model performance is very poor.
We can conclude that the assumption of this model is com-
pletely not applicable for vulnerability detection. We spec-
ulate that people are more passionate in finding vulnerabil-
ities rather than normal bugs. Meanwhile software testers
only focus on finding bugs until the reliability level of the
software reaches to a certain threshold. This also explain
for that AML is slightly better than other Reliability-based
models (i.e., RE, LP). The performance of LN, RE, LP are
2http://www.curveexpert.net/, site visited on 16 Sep,
2011
approximate because vulnerabilities of many of analyzed re-
leases are more or less in the linear phase.
The investigation on the evolution of goodness-of-fit en-
tropy and quality reports a notable impact of the data set
selection to the quality of a VDM, even though there is no
statistically difference of the goodness-of-fit entropy among
data sets. The NVD.Advice data set emerges as the best one
in terms of entropy (even though slightly), and quality.
However, this experiment is only based on one kind of
application. This might limit the final result. Therefore, as
part of future work, more similar experiments on other kinds
of applications, e.g., operating systems, web server applica-
tions, should be conducted in order to have solid conclusions.
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